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I. INTRODUCTION

I

n United States v. Microsoft,1 the infamous antitrust trial starting in
the late 1990s, a key contention was that Microsoft was conspiring
against Sun Microsystems.2 An internal Bill Gates e-mail surfaced in
which he asks, “Do we have a clear plan on what we want Apple to do
to undermine Sun?”3 When confronted with a transcript of the e-mail
in his videotaped deposition, Gates claimed that he did not remember
sending it.4 However, the e-mail proved to be incredibly damaging to
his defense and over time has become the classic example of how an email can serve as convincing evidence of a crime or wrong doing, or a
“smoking gun.”
In the modern era of technology, 294 billion e-mails are produced
every day creating electronic discovery (hereinafter “e-discovery”)
dilemmas for lawyers and judges throughout the country on a regular
basis.5 The technological advancements of the twenty-first century
have resulted in an enormous amount of electronically stored
information (hereinafter “ESI”) that can become discoverable in
virtually any lawsuit. In today’s digital age, e-mail has practically
become our default mode of communication. An e-mail address is so
vital to an individual’s life that it has evolved into more than a means
of communication. Today, an e-mail address represents a digital
blueprint of a person’s life, highlighting one’s financial position,
business associations, and personal interests. E-mails operate as
smoking guns in modern litigation because this medium of
communication invokes little precaution with its wording and subject
matter. Further, most individuals do not anticipate that their e-mails
will become a source of discoverable information in a lawsuit.
According to a recent study, sanctions for e-discovery violations
are occurring more frequently than ever.6 From January 1, 2000,
through January 1, 2010, the study indicates that of the 381 federal
cases in which sanctions for e-discovery violations were sought, 215

1

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
See id.
3
Susan Garland, This Version of Bill Gates Has a Memory Problem (Nov. 2,
1998, 8 p.m.), http://www.businessweek.com/Microsoft/updates/up81102a.htm.
4
Id.
5
Internet 2010 in Numbers, ROYAL.PINGDOM.COM, (Jan. 12, 2011), http://royal
.pingdom.com/2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbers.
6
See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790 (2010).
2
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resulted in sanctions being awarded.7 Defendants were sanctioned for
e-discovery violations nearly three times more than plaintiffs in
various cases throughout the country.8 Some of the sanctions were
especially severe and included default judgments, adverse jury
instructions, and large monetary fines.9 The number one reason for
imposing sanctions was a failure to preserve electronic evidence,
which was followed by a failure to produce ESI when responding to a
discovery request.10
An attorney’s role in handling the discovery of e-mails is a crucial
one. Therefore, every attorney must become aware of the vital role ediscovery plays in modern litigation in order to diligently and
competently represent their clients. As the technology of the day
continues to evolve, modern litigators must adapt and grow with it by
becoming proficient in this new area of law. An attorney who fails to
pursue the discovery of e-mails risks leaving unexamined a large
quantity of information that could have a decisive impact on the
outcome of litigation.11
This note serves as a guide for attorneys on how to properly handle
the preservation and discovery of e-mails and not subject oneself to the
risk of being sanctioned. Part II will clarify the level of due diligence
required to comply with a discovery request by explaining the rules
that frame the law of e-discovery and providing case law supporting
the due diligence standard. Part III will address resolving e-discovery
disputes, followed by Part IV, the conclusion.
II. THE DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD
A challenge in the modern era of law is for an attorney to locate
and retrieve all pertinent e-mails in connection with an e-discovery
request; however, the cost of diligently producing e-mails outweighs
the risk of subjecting yourself to sanctions for failing to preserve,
produce, or maintain them.
The year 2006 can be considered the beginning of the modern era
in e-discovery jurisprudence. In that year, Federal Rules 16, 26, 33, 34,
37, and 45 were amended to directly address ESI in an attempt to bring
7

Id. at 848.
Id. at 803.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See, e.g., Siemens Solar Indus. v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 93 Civ. 1126, 1994
WL 86368, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994).
8
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clarity and standardization to this vague area of law.12 The
amendments addressed a call for reform made by legal scholars13 and
codified federal judicial findings that stated emphatically “it is black
letter law computerized data is discoverable.”14
A. Preservation of E-Mails
In the context of e-discovery, an attorney’s duty of due diligence
begins with the preservation of e-mails. The determination of the
“trigger point,” at which preservation becomes necessary, is very fact
sensitive and extremely important.15 Black letter law has established
that the duty to preserve e-mails extends to the period before litigation
when a party reasonably should know that evidence may be relevant to
anticipated litigation.16 A plaintiff’s duty is more often triggered
before litigation commences, in large part because plaintiffs control
the timing of litigation.17
Moreover, case law holds that “[a] formal discovery request is not
necessary to trigger the duty to preserve evidence.”18 Thus, the duty
exists for a defendant, at the latest, when the defendant is served with
the complaint.19 Such a duty is ongoing, and a party must ensure that
relevant e-mails are preserved on a continuing basis.20 The duty of
preservation requires reasonable and good-faith efforts by a party to
retain their e-mails.21 It is imperative that a party preserves their e12

See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45.
Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil
Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C.L. REV. 327, 346 (2000).
14
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 CIV. 2120, 1995 WL 649934, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (“Today it is black letter law that computerized data is
discoverable if relevant.”); see also Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency,
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg,
L.L.C. (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Electronic documents
are no less subject to disclosure than paper records.”).
15
E.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am., 685
F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“It is well established that the duty to
preserve e-mails arises when a party reasonably anticipates litigation.”).
16
Id. at 466.
17
E.g., Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 334, 340 (D.
Conn. 2009) (holding that a duty to preserve arose when plaintiff retained counsel in
connection with potential legal action but had not yet identified responsible parties).
18
E.g., Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., L.L.C., No. 05-C-3003, 2006 WL
1308629 at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006).
19
See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 197 (D.S.C. 2008).
20
E.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C. (Zubulake II), 229 F.R.D. 422, 432
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
21
E.g., Pension Comm., 685 F.Supp.2d at 464.
13
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mails after the trigger point in litigation because it has become
increasing clear that modern day courts will not hesitate to sanction
lawyers for a failure to adhere to this clearly established standard.22
In order to comply with the duty of preservation, an attorney must
notify his client to place a “litigation hold” on all relevant e-mails at
the trigger point in litigation.23 Simply meaning, all e-mails that are
reasonably accessible and relevant must be preserved.24 However,
authorities are split on whether the duty of preservation extends to emails that are not reasonably accessible.25 For that reason, parties
should preserve all of their e-mails unless they have evidence to prove
that certain e-mails are not reasonably accessible because it would
place an undue burden on the party to produce them.26 If there is an
uncertainty as to whether the party can prove this, then he should be
sure to preserve the messages in question.
In the business context, the duty to preserve e-mails is imposed
throughout the company, creating an organizational duty of
preservation. Counsel should take steps to preserve discoverable
information including: (1) issuing a litigation hold at the outset of
litigation or whenever litigation is reasonably anticipated and should
periodically re-issue the hold so that new employees are aware of it,
and so it is fresh in the minds of all employees; (2) communicating
directly with the “key players” in the litigation, namely the employees
most likely to have relevant information, and periodically remind them
of preservation duty; and (3) instruct all employees to produce
electronic copies of their relevant active files.27 If an organization has
an e-mail retention or destruction policy, it is obligated to suspend that
policy once the duty of preservation has been triggered.28
In Pension Committee of University of Montreal Pension Plan v.
Banc of America,29 Justice Scheindlin noted that “it is well established
that the duty to preserve evidence arises when a party reasonably
anticipates litigation.”30 The court held that in the e-discovery context,
a failure to issue a written litigation hold constitutes gross negligence
22

E.g., Zubulake II, 229 F.R.D. at 436–37.
Id. at 431.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010).
27
Zubulake II, 229 F.R.D. at 433–34.
28
Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 524.
29
Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 685
F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
30
Id. at 466.
23
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because that failure is likely to result in the destruction of relevant
information.31 Further, the court held that a failure to preserve the emails of former employees that are in a party’s possession, custody, or
control can also support a finding of gross negligence.32 In the case at
hand, the plaintiffs were the spoliators and the court did not hesitate to
sanction them by ordering an adverse inference against them, imposing
monetary sanctions on each of the spoliators, and awarding the
defendants their reasonable costs, including attorneys’ fees associated
with the spoliation.33
The above case illustrates that it is now beyond question that if a
party is already embroiled in or reasonably anticipates litigation, that
current or prospective litigant, together with its counsel, absolutely
must issue a timely, written litigation hold and implement and oversee
the execution of that hold diligently and in good faith, or face
sanctions.34
B. Early Attention to E-Mails
Early attention to ESI is crucial in order to control the scope and
expense of e-discovery and to avoid potential disputes.35 Addressing
the issue at the onset of litigation is the most effective way to protect
oneself from future sanctions. An attorney must have a specific
understanding of his client’s electronic storage system prior to meeting
with the opposing party. With this information, the parties can develop
an e-discovery plan tailored to the capabilities of each party’s
computer system. At the Rule 26(f) conference, special attention must
be paid to e-mails and a good faith attempt should be made to define
the scope of e-discovery.36
Under the Federal Rules, a Rule 26(f) conference between the
parties to draft a discovery plan must include a discussion of any
issues relating to disclosure or discovery of ESI, including the forms or
form in which it should be produced.37 Form 35 may include a report
31

Id. at 465.
Id. at 468.
33
Id. at 470-71, 497.
34
Melissa DeHonney & Jeffrey L. Nagel, Zubulake Revisited: Pension
Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America
Securities, LLC, GIBBONSLAW.COM (Jan. 28 2010), http://www.gibbonslaw.com
/news_publications/articles.php?action=display_publication&publication_id=2983.
35
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 34, 45 (2006 advisory committee’s
notes).
36
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (2006 advisory committee’s note).
37
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C).
32
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to the court regarding this discussion and be submitted prior to the
courts’ scheduling order.38 Rule 16 has been amended to state that a
scheduling order issued at a pretrial conference may address
“disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information.”39
The parties should lobby fort a pretrial order that addresses ESI
because in many instances the court’s involvement early in litigation
can alert the court of potential issues and help avoid difficulties that
might otherwise arise later in the discovery process. The parties can
potentially save time and money by addressing the discovery of emails at the beginning of litigation and avoid costs incurred in the
expensive and time-consuming e-discovery process. Furthermore,
counsel should consult the local rules of his jurisdiction before a
discovery planning conference because they may impose additional or
specific requirements concerning ESI.
In National Day Laborer Organizing Network v. United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency,40 Justice Scheindlin
explains how important it is to pay early attention to ESI in modern
day lawsuits:
Once again, this Court is required to rule on an e-discovery issue
that could have been avoided had the parties had the good sense to
“meet and confer,” “cooperate” and generally make every effort to
“communicate” as to the form in which ESI would be produced.
The quoted words are found in opinion after opinion and yet
lawyers fail to take the necessary steps to fulfill their obligations to
each other and to the court… all lawyers -- even highly respected
private lawyers, Government lawyers, and professors of law -need to make greater efforts to comply with the expectations that
courts now demand of counsel with respect to expensive and timeconsuming document production. Lawyers are all too ready to
point the finger at the courts and the Rules for increasing the
expense of litigation, but that expense could be greatly diminished
if lawyers met their own obligations to ensure that document
production is handled as expeditiously and inexpensively as
possible. This can only be achieved through cooperation and
41
communication.

38

FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii).
Id.
40
Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Networks v. U. S. Immigr. and Cust. Enforcement
Agency, No. 10 Civ. 3488, 2011 WL 381625 at * 31, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
41
Id. (Opinion and Order withdrawn per order from court June 17, 2011, and has
no precedential value. However, Justice Scheindlin’s discussion on the importance of
paying early attention to ESI is applicable to show the current state of e-discovery
law).
39
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C. Proportionality in E-Discovery
A discovery request for the production of documents aimed at
some electronic form is no different, theoretically, from a request for
documents contained in an office file cabinet.42 Likewise, a party may
request that the opposing party produce and permit inspection,
copying, testing, or sampling of ESI that is in the opposing parties’
control or possession.43 However, as the court noted in RodriguezTorres v. Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, “discovery is
not meant to serve as a fishing expedition.”44
The cost of e-discovery has skyrocketed as more and more
information is being electronically stored simply because it is cheaper
and easier to retain and preserve than paper documents. Therefore,
litigants and courts should approach e-discovery differently depending
on what is at stake in the case and how complex the issues are
expected to be. Courts should apply the concept of proportionality to
the scope of e-discovery, and not force discovery when the cost or
burden is disproportionately large compared to what is at stake in the
litigation.45 As the court explained in Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v.
Cammarata, “[w]hether preservation or discovery conduct is
acceptable in a case depends on what is reasonable, and that in turn
depends on whether what was done—or not done—was proportional
to that case and consistent with clearly established standards.”46
D. Production of E-Mails
The newly amended Rule 34 includes ESI within the definition of
discoverable information. Under the rule, a requesting party may
designate the form or forms in which e-mails should be produced.47 If
42

See, e.g., Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super.
Ct. June 16, 1999).
43
See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Zanesville, 954 F.2d 349, 352–53 (6th Cir. 1992);
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1).
44
Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R.
2010).
45
John L. Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32
CAMPBELL L. REV. 455, 460 (2010).
46
Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammerata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D.
Tex. 2010); But see Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429,
436 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding the standard set forth in Rimkus to be “too amorphous”
and holding that, “until a more precise definition is created by rule, a party is welladvised to retain all relevant documents (but not multiple identical copies) in
existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches”).
47
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C).
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the requesting party has not specified a form of production, the
responding party should let opposing counsel know in advance the
form in which he intends to produce his e-mails. Advance notice and
communication between the parties will save costs by avoiding
potential disputes and duplicate production.48
The rule allows the responding party to produce e-mails in the
form in which they are ordinarily maintained, or in a reasonably usable
format.49 The right of the requesting party to receive e-mails in their
original form could potentially be waived if a specific demand for emails to be produced in native format50 is not made at the beginning of
discovery.51
If the responding party chooses to object to production of e-mails
in the form sought, he must include within his objection the form he
intends to produce his e-mails.52 If the requesting party disagrees with
the counterproposal, the parties should diligently attempt to resolve the
disagreement. If they cannot, the requesting party may make a motion
to compel production in the requested form. However, the court’s
decision may drive up costs for both parties.
E. Accessible Versus Inaccessible E-Mails
Rule 26 has been revised under the amendments to provide that a
party must produce ESI as part of its required initial disclosures.53
When a discovery request for the production of e-mails is made, the
responding party must produce all e-mails that are reasonably
accessible; however, there is no duty on the responding party to
48

Chapman v. General Bd. of Pension and Health Benefits of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., No. 09 C-3474, 2010 WL 2679961, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 6,
2010); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D).
49
See, e.g., India Brewing, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190, 194
(E.D. Wis. 2006) (“A party may request information in a specific electronic format,
but if it instead simply asks for ‘documents’ . . . production in electronic form is not
required.”).
50
Sedona Conference Glossary: E-Discovery & Digital Information
Management
(2nd
Ed.),
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did
=TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf. at 35 (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) (“Native format” is the
format of a file as it was created inside a computer software format, i.e. documents
generated in Microsoft Word have a “.doc” native format.).
51
See, e.g., Chapman, 2010 WL 2679961, at *5 (explaining that the federal rules
do not require production of electronic records in native format, when requesting
party did not request production in that format; once production was made in hardcopy form, producing party would not be required to re-produce in native form).
52
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D).
53
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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produce e-mails that are “not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost.”54
The amended rule creates a two-tiered approach to the production
of ESI, making a distinction between information that is reasonably
accessible and that which is not.55 Under the first tier, a party must
produce e-mails that are reasonably accessible as long as they are
relevant and not privileged.56 Under the second tier, a responding party
does not need to produce e-mails from sources that it identifies as not
reasonably accessible because of an undue burden or cost.57 Whether
e-mails are accessible or inaccessible hinges largely on the media
through which it is stored.58 Accessible data is stored in a readily
usable format; “although the time it takes to actually access that data
ranges from milliseconds to days, the data does not need to be restored
or otherwise manipulated to be usable.”59 Inaccessible data is not
readily usable, i.e. information must be reconstructed, lost data must
be restored, fragmented data must be de-fragmented, and all before it
is usable.60
If counsel objects to an e-discovery request aimed at e-mails, the
burden is on the objecting party to make the required showing that the
e-mails sought are not reasonably accessible.61 Before a responding
party brings a burdensomeness argument before the court, he must
make a diligent, good faith effort to produce the e-mails demanded at
the lowest possible cost.62 A party objecting to the discovery of emails on the ground that they are not reasonably accessible must be
certain not to make general, vague objections.63 The party should
strongly consider retaining an e-discovery expert to certify that the emails sought are not reasonably accessible and provide other evidence

54

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
See, e.g., Zubalake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubalake I), 217 F.R.D. 309,
315–18; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
56
See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 315, 318–22; see also FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2).
57
Zubalake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318.
58
Id. at 318.
59
Id. at 320.
60
Id.
61
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
62
See, e.g., Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C-07-532,
2008 WL 1805727, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008).
63
See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Church & Dwight Co., 747 F. Supp. 2d 3, 7
(D.D.C. 2010).
55
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to support his objection. Vague and unsupported assertions of undue
burden will inevitably be rejected by the court.64
Discovery imposes an undue burden or expense when the burden
“outweighs its benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving
the issues.”65 Some burden on the responding party is to be expected
and, simply put, the failure to provide supporting evidence to a
burdensome argument will not result in a favorable outcome.66 To
succeed in establishing that the requested discovery will be
disproportionately burdensome, a party will be required to provide the
court with evidence about the costs or personnel hours that will be
required to obtain, review, and produce the requested information.67
Courts have found e-mails not to be reasonably accessible because
of an undue burden on the responding party.68 In Rodriquez-Torres,
the plaintiffs sought through discovery “all e-mail communications
and calendar entries describing, relating or referring to plaintiff Vicky
Rodriguez, both inbound and outbound from co-defendant GDB’s
messaging system servers” for a three-year period spanning from 2007
through 2009.69 The parties submitted a report which estimated the
cost of producing the ESI at $35,000.70 The court found that $35,000
was “too high of a cost for the production of the requested [ESI] in this
type of action.”71 In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs sought $1.4
million dollars in compensatory damages.72 The court denied
plaintiffs’ motion to compel the production of e-mails, ruling they
were not reasonably accessible under Rule 26(b)(2)(B).73
F. Protected E-Mails
Discoverable information is no longer stored in boxes and file
cabinets but rather in digital technologies such as e-mail accounts
within a computer hard drive. Generally, a party responding to a
64

See, e.g., Mikron Indu., Inc., 2008 WL 1805727, at *2.
Zubalake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubalake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 318.
66
Fed. Trade Comm’n, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 5.
67
Id. at 4.
68
E.g., Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 43 (D.P.R.
2010).
69
Id. at 43.
70
Id. at 44.
71
Id.
72
Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40 (D.P.R. 2010).
73
Id. at 45.
65
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discovery request for e-mails will have to provide an abnormally large
volume of information. The increased amount of data that an attorney
must now produce makes it more difficult to determine if such ESI
contains privileged information. The Federal Rules address this risk by
providing that if a party inadvertently provides privileged or trial
preparation information, a party must promptly return, sequester, or
destroy the information.74
A responding party does not have to produce e-mails that are
protected by the attorney-client privilege.75 “[A]ttorney-client
privilege protects communications if: (1) the relation of attorney and
client existed at the time the communication was made, (2) the
communication was made in confidence, (3) the communication
relates to a matter about which the attorney is being professionally
consulted, (4) the communication was made in the course of giving or
seeking legal advice for a proper purpose although litigation need not
be contemplated, and (5) the client has not waived the privilege.”76
E-mail communication between an attorney and client must be
confidential in order to qualify for the attorney-client privilege.77 The
attorney-client privilege does not apply to e-mails that are
informational only, even when sent to or from an attorney.78 A
responding party cannot make a blanket claim of privilege but must
provide specific and articulate evidence to show that an e-mail is
protected.79 Such evidence may include producing a test sample of the
information sought and explaining how the privilege exists. The courts
will not allow responding parties to use a blanket attorney-client
privilege objection as a tool to block the discovery of e-mails.80
Amended Rule 37 now contains what is commonly referred to as a
“safe harbor” provision. The rule states that “absent exceptional
circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a
74
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party for failing to provide ESI lost as a result of the routine, goodfaith operation of an electronic information system.”81
G. Spoliation of E-Mails
At no point in time should a responding party alter or destroy emails. As e-discovery jurisprudence matures, the fact that e-mails were
deleted because of carelessness, and not bad faith, will not save a
responding party from being sanctioned.82 The most important duty on
the responding party is the preservation of relevant e-mails and to
ensure that they are not materially altered or deleted.
“Spoliation of evidence” is the destruction or material alteration of
evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.83 In addition
to Rule 37, “the right to impose sanctions for spoliation arises from a
court’s inherent power to control the judicial process and litigation, but
the power is limited to that necessary to remedy conduct which abuses
the judicial process.”84 There are countless cases that demonstrate
courts’ willingness to impose sanctions if an attorney fails to prevent
his clients from materially altering or destroying e-mails.85
The landmark case, Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.,86
serves as an example of how prevalent spoliation of e-mails has
become in modern litigation. Justice Grimm described this case as,
“the single most egregious example of spoliation that I have
encountered in any case that I have handled or in any case described in
the legion of spoliation cases I have read in nearly fourteen years on
the bench.”87
In the case, the defendants demonstrated an unwillingness to
preserve e-mails that were relevant to litigation. When litigation was
reasonably foreseeable the defendants failed to place a litigation hold
on their e-mails, deleted e-mails after the plaintiff filed suit, failed to
preserve e-mails after the plaintiff demanded their preservation, and
81
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deleted e-mails after the court issued numerous preservation orders.88
The court found that the defendants engaged in willful, bad faith
misconduct, and implemented an adverse inference that the deleted
information was relevant. Further, the court granted monetary
sanctions, including fees and costs associated with all e-discovery
occurring as a result of the defendant’s spoliation, and ordered that the
defendant’s president be imprisoned for up to two years unless and
until he paid plaintiff’s fees and costs.89 This case provides an
important lesson to lawyers of the severe consequences that courts will
impose if those lawyers partake in the spoliation of ESI.
Aside from the outrageous behavior of the defendants, this case
gained national recognition because Justice Grimm provided a twelvepage chart citing e-discovery cases from the various circuits as an
attempt to show the split in legal standards that have been established
to impose sanctions.90
H. Discovery of E-Mails Held by Third Parties
Rule 45 has been amended to address the production of documents
by third parties pursuant to a subpoena. If a subpoena does not specify
a form for producing ESI, the person responding must produce it in the
form it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form.91
Moreover, the responding party does not need to produce the same ESI
in more than one form and does not have to produce e-mails from
sources that he identifies as not reasonably accessible because of
undue burden or cost.92
The Stored Communications Act93 (hereinafter “SCA”) forms part
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act94 (hereinafter “ECPA”)
and sets out the provisions for privacy protections, access, use,
interception, and disclosure of electronic communications.95 The law
was enacted in 1986 and covers various forms of wire and electronic
communications, including e-mails.96 The SCA addresses voluntary
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and compelled disclosure of stored electronic communications held by
third-party internet service providers .97
The SCA provides that any “person or entity providing an
electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly
divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while
in electronic storage by that service.”98 The statute provides exceptions
under which the provider may divulge the contents of a
communication.99 Two notable and commonly relied upon exceptions
are first, allowing the provider to release the requested information
upon receiving lawful consent of the originator, and an addressee, an
intended recipient, or the subscriber in the case of remote service; and
second, allowing the provider to release the requested information
upon a court order.100
In civil litigation there is a great debate over whether a defendant
or third party company must comply with a court order for discovery
aimed at e-mails stored by internet service providers.101 Some courts
have held that an internet service provider does not have to produce emails within its storage system even when presented with a court
order.102 The Digital Due Process Coalition, which consists of
attorneys, law school students, and companies such as Google and
Facebook, is fighting emphatically to amend the ECPA in an attempt
to bring clarity to this area of law within the realm of the developing ediscovery jurisprudence.103
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III. RESOLVING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY DISPUTES
A. Motion for a Protective Order
A party responding to a discovery request for the production of emails can file a motion for a protective order. The party from whom
discovery is sought must show that the e-mails are not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost when moving for a
protective order.104 If such a showing is made, the court may
nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party
shows good cause.105 The requesting party can demonstrate good cause
by showing: (1) the information cannot be obtained from another
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (2)
the responding party has had ample opportunity to obtain the
information; or (3) that the benefit of the information outweighs the
burden of its production considering the needs of the case, amount in
controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, and the importance of discovery in resolving the
issues.106
The court has broad discretion to issue protective orders.107 The
court’s power includes, but is not limited to, blocking discovery,
setting terms and conditions on discovery, tailoring discovery requests,
shifting costs, and ordering sampling or testing to assess likelihood of
finding relevant information.108 The court further noted in RodriquezTorres that it could order production of the e-mails, despite the
excessive cost, if good cause could be shown by the plaintiffs.109
However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ request was merely a
“fishing expedition” and denied their motion to compel; holding that
“just because emails are more likely to lead to inappropriate comments
is not a sufficient basis to believe that the [ESI] requested here will
lead to the discovery of the information Plaintiffs claim they will
discover.”110
104
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If the court finds that the e-mails are not reasonably accessible but
nonetheless orders production because the requesting party has shown
good cause, then the court should conduct a cost shifting analysis. In
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C., Judge Scheindlin set forth a sevenfactor test to determine if the cost of production should shift from the
producing party to the requesting party. No one factor is determinative
and the factors that should be considered are: (1) the extent the
requested discovery specifically is tailored to relevant information; (2)
the availability of such information; (3) the total amount of production
versus the amount in controversy; (4) total cost of production versus
each party’s available resources; (5) relative ability of each party to
control costs and incentive to do so; (6) importance of the issues at
stake; and (7) relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information.111 The majority rule set forth in Zubalake is that cost
shifting should only be considered for discovery of e-mails that are not
reasonably accessible.112
However, a minority of courts across the country have declined to
follow the rule that cost shifting applies only to the discovery of emails that are not reasonably accessible.113 In Multitechnology
Services, L.P. v. Verizon Southwest, the court rejects the argument that
cost shifting is only appropriate when ESI is not reasonably accessible,
holding that “Zubulake is a district court opinion without binding
authority.”114 The court further found that “requiring the parties to
evenly shoulder the expense is the most effective resolution because it
balances the benefit of the discovery . . . and provides . . . incentive to
manage costs it incurs.”115 The court concluded by stating “it is
appropriate to classify the expense [from discovery of ESI] as court
costs that can be recovered by the prevailing party.”116
B. Sanctions
As e-discovery jurisprudence continues to be defined, courts are
sending the message that improper conduct will not be tolerated by
awarding sanctions at a steadily increasing pace. An attorney should
move for sanctions if he suspects that opposing counsel has failed to
111
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preserve or has deleted e-mails that are relevant to pending litigation.
Sanctions for a failure to preserve e-mails or the spoliation of e-mails
have included costs, attorneys’ fees, and fines, which not only
compensate the prejudiced party but also punish the offending party
for its actions and deter the litigant’s conduct.117 Under certain
circumstances, a court may order an adverse inference instruction if a
party breaches his duty of preservation or materially alters e-mails.118
Further, under very severe circumstances, a court has the authority to
impose the ultimate sanction and order a default judgment for the
spoliation of e-mails.119
An attorney breaches his duty of preservation when he displays an
unwillingness to preserve e-mails or if he shows a level of carelessness
that is disproportionate to clearly established standards.120 Black-letter
law has established that “it is now beyond question that if a party is
already embroiled in or reasonably anticipates litigation, that current or
prospective litigant, together with its counsel, absolutely must issue a
timely, written litigation hold and implement and oversee the
execution of that hold diligently and in good faith, or face
sanctions.”121 Opposing counsel should move for sanctions if an
attorney does not conform to this established duty of preservation.
The Fourth Circuit held that in order to prove spoliation that
warrants a sanction, “A party must show: (1) the party having control
over the ESI had an obligation to preserve it when it was destroyed or
altered; (2) the destruction or loss was accompanied by a culpable state
of mind; and (3) the e-mail that was destroyed or altered was relevant
to the claims or defenses of the party that sought discovery of the
spoliated evidence, to the extent that a reasonable fact finder could
conclude that the lost e-mail would have supported the claims or
defenses of the party that sought it.”122 District courts in the Second,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits also used these factors to
determine if spoliation rises to a level that requires sanctions.123 The
First, Third, and Tenth Circuit test to determine sanction-worthy
spoliation is: (1) was there spoliation, and (2) if so, what sanctions are
117
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appropriate, with state of mind only figuring into the second factor.124
The Federal Circuit “applies the law of the regional circuit from which
the case arose” when reviewing sanction orders.125
Most circuits agree that in order to impose an adverse jury
instruction for spoliation of e-mails, a court must find that the spoliator
acted willfully in the destruction of evidence.126A court may order an
adverse inference instruction for spoliation, which informs the jury
that it may draw adverse inferences from the loss or destruction of
evidence, by assuming that failure to preserve was because the
spoliator was aware that the e-mail would have been detrimental.127
The circuits seem to agree that in order to award a default
judgment for spoliation of e-mails, a court must be able to conclude
either that the spoliator’s conduct was so outrageous as to amount to a
forfeiture of his claim or defense, or that the effect of the spoliator’s
conduct was so prejudicial that it substantially denied the opposing
party the ability to present or defend the claim.128
IV. CONCLUSION
The discoverability of e-mails is an area of law that every modernday lawyer must be familiar with in order to avoid the risk of being
sanctioned. Over the past years, courts have awarded sanctions to
moving parties at a steadily increasing pace. The sanctions for ediscovery malpractice have included adverse jury instructions, default
judgments, attorneys’ fees, large monetary fines, and in one instance, a
jail sentence.129 If an attorney adheres to the following standard when
dealing with e-mails throughout the course of litigation, then he should
not face sanctions for e-discovery malpractice.
An attorney’s duty of due diligence in e-discovery starts well
before a formal discovery request is filed. He must first inform his
clients of his duty of preservation. A party’s duty of preservation is
triggered when he reasonably anticipates litigation.130 At this point in
time, counsel must inform his clients to issue a written litigation hold
124
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in order to preserve all e-mails. The litigation hold must suspend the
party’s retention/deletion program until the lawsuit has ended.131
Further, counsel is required to oversee the execution of the hold
diligently and in good faith to ensure its effectiveness.132
While the litigation hold is in effect, the party cannot partake in the
spoliation of e-mails. As e-discovery jurisprudence continues to
develop, it is clear that courts will not hesitate to enforce sanctions
when spoliation of e-mails occurs. The fact that e-mails were deleted
because of carelessness, and not bad faith, will not save a responding
party from being sanctioned.133 Within the realm of e-discovery, one
of the most important duties an attorney owes to his client is to educate
them of the severe consequences that can occur if they fail to preserve
their e-mails, or if they materially alter or delete them.
An attorney must take the Rule 26(f) discovery planning
conference seriously. The conference should be used as an opportunity
to address e-mails early in litigation, to define the scope of ediscovery, to decide on the form in which e-mails will be produced, to
establish a proportional e-discovery plan as an attempt to control cost,
and to notify the court of disputes that may arise in the e-discovery
context. The results of this discussion should be reported to the court
and a request should be made to have the court’s pretrial scheduling
order state what e-mails should be produced and in which form.134 By
addressing these issues at the discovery planning conference, an
attorney will save his client from unnecessary costs that can occur
during the expensive and time consuming e-discovery process.
An attorney responding to an e-discovery request for e-mails
should produce them in the form agreed to by the parties, ordered by
the court, specified by the requesting party, or if no form is specified,
in a form in which it is ordinarily maintained or a form that is
reasonably usable.135 Should the responding attorney object to
production of e-mails in the form sought, he must include within his
objection the form in which he intends to produce his e-mails.136 If the
requesting party disagrees with the counterproposal, the two sides will
inevitably turn to the court to decide the issue. The court’s
involvement to determine the form of production drives up the cost of
131

Id.
DeHonney, supra note 34.
133
Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467–68.
134
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii).
135
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E).
136
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D).
132

2012

The Discoverability of E-Mail

203

litigation and is precisely why the two sides should agree on the form
of production for e-mails at the discovery planning conference.
When responding to an e-discovery request, an attorney must
produce all e-mails that are reasonably accessible and nonprivileged.137 The responding attorney does not have to produce emails that are not reasonably accessible because of an undue burden or
cost.138 The attorney cannot make a blanket claim that e-mails are not
reasonably accessible, but rather they must provide the court with
evidence showing the way the e-mails are stored and the personnel
hours it would take to produce them.139 Further, an e-discovery expert
should also be consulted to confirm that the e-mails are actually
inaccessible. If the court requires the production of non-reasonably
accessible e-mails because the opposing side shows good cause, the
attorney should insist that cost shifting be applied.140
Following this framework and establishing an open and continuous
dialog with the court and opposing counsel should ensure that the
attorney diligently and competently represented his clients and not
subject him to possible sanctions. It is essential that modern-day
lawyers become acquainted with the e-discovery standards of their
jurisdiction and grasp the crucial role that discovery of e-mails plays in
virtually every lawsuit. Modern technology is transforming the way
individuals communicate and the way information is stored and courts
are sending the message that improper conduct and ignorance will not
be tolerated in this developing area of law by awarding sanctions at an
alarmingly increasing pace.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: E-Discovery Sanction Statistics141
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Appendix B: Annual No. of E-Discovery Sanction Cases143
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Appendix C: Annual No. of E-Discovery Sanction Awards 144
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